Fire truck data raises questions over Eaton fire response in Altadena
Iain Hoey
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Fire truck data shows delayed response in west Altadena
Data obtained by The Times has revealed that only one Los Angeles County fire truck was present in west Altadena when the Eaton fire reached the area, where 18 of the 19 fatalities occurred.
According to The Times, 40 county fire trucks were instead concentrated around the Palisades fire, while 64 were deployed to the east side of Altadena and nearby areas.
L.A. County Fire Chief Anthony Marrone told The Times the lack of trucks in west Altadena was likely due to “human error” by decision-makers in the incident command.
Marrone said the command team, based at the Rose Bowl, failed to divide resources evenly between east and west Altadena as the fire developed.
The county has not conducted its own analysis of fire truck locations. Marrone said this work has been assigned to an external organisation.
Residents left without help as fire spread
Residents interviewed by The Times described a night of fighting flames alone while waiting for firefighters who never arrived.
Sofia Vidal, who lost her pet tortoise and her home, told The Times: “We were abandoned. I never heard a siren.”
Vidal added: “Am I grateful for firemen? Not at all. Did they fail me miserably? Absolutely.”
An Altadena-based public interest research firm interviewed over 1,200 residents and found that nearly one in five believed the fire department let the area burn on purpose.
The neighbourhood is a racially diverse part of unincorporated Los Angeles County, historically home to many Black families.
According to The Times, many residents believe their area received less fire protection than whiter, wealthier neighbourhoods near the Palisades.
Incident commanders focused on areas already burning
The Times analysis showed that most county fire trucks remained east of Lake Avenue, which divided east and west Altadena, even as 911 calls from west Altadena increased.
Former fire officials told The Times the unified incident command did not effectively track where the fire was spreading or reposition fire resources based on forecasted spread and 911 data.
One former incident commander said too many trucks were directed toward visible flames rather than areas at risk.
The official told The Times: “It takes leadership and situational awareness to direct that as an incident commander and say, ‘Hey guys, I don’t need you there. I need you to defend homes and evacuation in this other community.’”
County data showed only one patrol vehicle crossed into west Altadena in the first 12 hours of the fire.
Late evacuation orders and delayed fire truck movement
Evacuation orders were not issued for west Altadena until 3:25 a.m. on 8 January, according to The Times, over four hours after flames were reported in the area.
East Altadena received its first evacuation order the evening before, at 6:40 p.m.
Despite multiple 911 calls reporting fire in west Altadena, vehicle locator data showed no county fire trucks responded to the area until several hours later.
By the time evacuation was ordered, The Times reported 17 calls had come from homes west of Lake Avenue.
In many cases, no aid ever arrived. The Times identified multiple victims who died after calling 911, including Anthony Mitchell Sr., a disabled man, and his son.
Multiple blazes strained county resources
The Times reported that county fire crews were already deployed to assist the Los Angeles Fire Department with a blaze in Pacific Palisades earlier in the day.
By evening, over one-third of the county’s fire vehicles were in that area, 40 miles from the later Eaton fire in Altadena.
Chief Marrone told The Times he had 1,800 firefighters available and ordered 50 strike teams that evening, adding about 250 more vehicles.
The fire in Eaton Canyon began at 6:18 p.m., quickly spreading due to hurricane-force winds.
As the fire grew, county resources concentrated in east Altadena, with few vehicles diverted west.
Union head Dave Gillotte told The Times: “We did not have enough people to shift in masses from one area of Altadena to another.”
Questions over incident command responsibility
The unified command included the L.A. County Fire Department, U.S. Forest Service, Sheriff’s Department and other agencies.
Marrone told The Times he believed responsibility for west Altadena was shared and said: “I’m not going to allow L.A. County Fire or the men and women of my department to take this on the chin.”
Marrone added that the department did not track trucks from other agencies and that GPS data provided only a partial picture of the response.
The Times noted that many vehicles from outside agencies were not included in the data set.
Some residents, however, said they did not see fire trucks in their neighbourhoods until long after the damage was done.
Sylvie Andrews, who returned home at 11 a.m. on 8 January, told The Times: “It was fightable, and they were not fighting at all.”
Fire truck data raises questions over Eaton fire response in Altadena: Summary
Only one county fire truck was in west Altadena during the peak of the Eaton fire.
Vehicle locator data were obtained by The Times via a public records request.
The data show most trucks remained in east Altadena or at the Palisades fire.
Eighteen of the 19 fatalities occurred in west Altadena.
Residents reported no firefighter presence and delayed evacuation orders.
Chief Anthony Marrone cited “human error” in resource allocation.
Unified command was based at the Rose Bowl and included multiple agencies.
The county has hired McChrystal Group to review evacuation decisions.
The Fire Safety Research Institute will conduct an independent response review.
Some fire leaders defended the focus on areas with trapped residents.
Other officials questioned why resources weren’t redeployed to growing fires.
Many 911 calls from west Altadena were not answered by county trucks.
Residents are questioning whether their area received adequate protection.
The Times analysis does not include vehicles from all responding agencies.